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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
The Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code, section 
78-2-2(3)(c), and Utah Constitution, article VIII, section 4. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the District Court err by imposing another suspension upon an 
attorney who continued to practice law while under a previous order of 
suspension, and who made false statements of fact to the court? The standard 
of review of sanctions for professional misconduct in attori ley discipline actions is 
a correctness standard, and the Utah Supreme Court may make an independent 
judgment regarding the appropriate level of discipline if the evidence warrants it. 
See In re Babilis, 951 P.2d 207 (Utah 1997). This issue was preserved for 
review through the arguments set forth in the Office of Professional Conduct's 
Hearing Brief, and through the oral argument of its counsel. (R. 144-156; 227 at 
185-196) 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
AND RULES 
Rules 
Rule 4.2, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 
4.2. Disbarment. 
Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer: 
(a) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined in 
Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct with 
the intent to benefit the lawyer or another or to deceive the court, 
and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a party, the 
public, or the legal system, or causes serious or potentially serious 
interference with a legal proceeding; or 
(b) engages in serious criminal conduct, a necessary element of 
which includes intentional interference with the administration of 
justice, false swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, extortion, 
misappropriation, or theft; or the sale, distribution, or importation of 
controlled substances; or the intentional killing of another; or an 
attempt or conspiracy or solicitation of another to commit any of 
these offenses; or 
(c) engages in any other intentional misconduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously 
adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: This is an attorney discipline case. 
Course of Proceedings: The case originated in a disciplinary proceeding 
against Doncouse. (R. 1-7) By District Court order, Doncouse was suspended 
for violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct. (R. 16-17) The OPC initiated 
contempt proceedings against Doncouse for allegedly continuing to practice law 
during the period of his suspension. (R. 113-116; 77-112) The District Court 
found that Doncouse continued to practice law in violation of the order of 
suspension, and submitted a false affidavit to the court. (R. 203-207) 
Disposition in the District Court: The District Court imposed upon 
Doncouse a sanction of suspension for a period of one year. (R. 207) 
STATEMENT OF THE RELEVANT FACTS 
The District Court entered an Order of Discipline: Suspension against 
Doncouse on March 1, 2002, suspending Doncouse from the practice of law for a 
period of ninety days, commencing March 1, 2002. (R. 16-17) During the period 
of his suspension, Doncouse continued to engage in the practice of law. (R. 203-
207) The District Court's findings and conclusions are summarized in the 
2 
paragraphs that follow, taken nearly verbatim from the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order of Discipline and, where indicated, quoting the 
court's comments.1 
Doncouse requested access to an inmate client at the Utah State Prison. 
(R. 204) He identified himself as an attorney, used his Bar number, and signed 
papers identifying himself as the attorney of record for the inmate. (R. 204) The 
court stated: 
The first problem and a violation that I would see is the signing of 
the documents at the prison. Let's see. EXHIBITS #3,2 4, and 54 
outline, and #65 actually in addition, outline the representations 
that, that Mr. Doncouse, you were signing as, as an attorney. And 
associated with that is a privilege not only to hold yourself out as an 
attorney but the privilege that you might be admitted into the prison. 
And that's associated with the status of attorney. And so by holding 
yourself out that way I think you availed yourself, or at least 
attempted to avail yourself of that privilege. And a, that's where the 
violation applies. A, there were multiple representations of it. I 
think even handing them your Bar card is questionable, frankly, at 
that point. I mean, it's almost like someone who hasn't had their 
driver's license taken away for a DUI, somehow managing to keep 
it and then using it. It's not a valid permission really. So that's 
problematic. I think that, those representations, a, regardless of 
why you were there, whether you were there just simply to drop off 
documents or not, the attempt to obtain access by representing 
yourself as a currently practicing attorney I think is a violation of the 
order. 
(R. 227 at 179-180) 
1
 The courts verbal findings commence at page 177 of the transcript, R. 227. 
2
 Exhibit 3 is a copy of the Draper prison log with Doncouse's indication that he 
was attorney of record for the prisoner he sought to visit. (R. 227 at 18-19) 
3
 Exhibit 4 is a form captioned "Attorney or Legal Assistant Application" filled out 
by Doncouse, identifying him as the legal firm Doncouse and Murray, using his 
Bar number, and identifying himself as the attorney of record. (R. 227 at 19-20) 
4
 Exhibit 5 is captioned "Attorney, Legal Representative, Rules and Regulations 
Orientation Form." (R. 227 at 20) Doncouse signed a statement identifying 
himself as "an attorney or legal attorney/representative." (R. 227 at 21) 
5
 Exhibit 6 is captioned "Department of Corrections Legal Access Agreement." 
(R. 227 at 21) Doncouse initialed its paragraphs. (R. 227 at 22) 
3 
Doncouse filed in court on behalf of a client a reply memorandum that 
Doncouse signed and which held him out as the attorney of record for the client. 
(R. 204) The court's comments follow: 
The second problem is the filing of the a, reply memorandum in 
the Lisa Davis versus Mike (inaudible word) case. This is EXHIBIT 
#7.6 Again, it's the filing of it that's the problem. Because the filing 
of it is associated with the privilege of attorney. Not just anyone 
can come in and file documents. If a person is representing 
themselves pro se you can file a document if you're not an attorney. 
But normally we don't accept documents filed from individuals who 
are not attorneys. 
That coupled with the fact that you've identified yourself as 
attorney for plaintiff in that document, regardless of when you 
prepared it, it was the filing that's the technical problem. And that 
occurred during April. I don't think there's any question about it. 
It's date stamped on the top April 23rd, it's dated April 22nd. A, so I 
think that in and of itself is, is a violation. 
(R. 227 at 180-181) 
Doncouse undertook the representation of a client in a personal injury 
matter. (R. 204) Doncouse failed to disclose to the client that Doncouse was 
suspended from the practice of law and therefore could not accept new client 
matters. (R. 204) 
Probably the, the one that troubles me the most is the Perry 
situation. . . . 
The fact of the matter is, a, I think they contacted you in May. And 
I think it's pretty clear that you went out and saw them in May. And 
they hired you in May. That was their understanding. 
It makes, it just doesn't make any sense to me that you would 
have gone out there just to visit them knowing full well that they, 
that you thought they probably had a case. And then take photos 
6
 The document referred to is a Reply to the Defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's 
Motion to Vacate Motion to Dismiss in a personal injury case Doncouse "had for 
a number of years." (R. 227 at 24) 
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and talk with them about their situation knowing that it might be a 
lucrative case and very tempting.... 
I'm going to find that you did that and that was during May. And 
that I think is probably the most serious problem a, in terms of 
generating clients during the time when you were suspended. And 
I would find that that, that did occur. 
(R. 227 at 182-183) 
Doncouse knowingly violated the Order of Discipline: Suspension when he 
filed the document in court, represented to prison officials that he was an 
attorney, and undertook the representation of a new client. (R. 204) 
Doncouse submitted to the Court an Affidavit of Compliance falsely stating 
that he "refrained from the practice of law during the period of March 1, 2002 
through May 31, 2002." (R. 204) The affidavit was "duly sworn," and "affirms" 
that "[d]uring the period of February 1, 2002 and February 28, 2002, I worked to 
wind down my practice was able to obtain the assistance of Duncan Torr Murray 
to step in as counsel for those clients that remained with my office beyond 
February 28, 2002."7 (R. 24) 
The District Court addressed the actual and potential injury caused by 
Doncouse's actions as follows: 
There was potential injury to the personal injury client, inasmuch 
as Doncouse was not able to adequately handle the case during 
the period of his suspension. Additionally, Doncouse's failure to 
take action may in fact have prejudiced [the client's] case. 
Doncouse's actions also caused significant damage to the legal 
system itself because if a lawyer practices law while the lawyer is 
suspended, it creates and casts doubts on the integrity of the 
system itself. Moreover, the representations Doncouse made to 
This statement directly contradicts Doncouse's testimony that he was unaware 
that the wind-down period was exclusive of the period of his suspension. (R. 227 
at 172) The District Court stated that there was confusion about the wind-down 
period, but "the violations really didn't occur during that time period. . . ." (R. 227 
at 179) 
5 
prison officials and the necessity of going through this kind of 
disciplinary hearing casts a negative aspect on lawyers generally 
and on the practice of law. 
(R. 205) 
The District Court found aggravating circumstances as follows: 
Doncouse has a prior record of discipline; Doncouse had a 
selfish motive in taking [the new client's] case; there were multiple 
cases, although none standing on its own was extremely bad, but 
taken as a group they showed disregard for the initial sanction; 
there were deceptive practices in the form of submitting an affidavit 
indicating that Doncouse had complied with all of the terms of the 
suspension and asked to be reinstated. 
(R. 205) 
The District Court's view of the mitigating circumstances is as follows: 
"Doncouse made a sincere effort to try to comply with the suspension by 
transferring cases, but it wasn't complete and that is where the problem lies." (R. 
205) It also stated, "The OPC has indicated that Doncouse was extremely 
cooperative with them and cordial throughout these rather tense proceedings, 
although it created a certain amount of anxiety and tension for Doncouse and he 
handled himself well and was cooperative with the OPC." (R. 205) 
The evidence concerning Doncouse's attitude toward the disciplinary 
proceedings was limited to Doncouse's testimony concerning the initial 
disciplinary action against him, in which he stated that he and the OPC "were 
working very hard to work out an arrangement that we both thought was fair for 
the violations that I had committed." (R. 227 at 145) The Court's finding is 
confined to the comment of counsel for the OPC, which was not testimony, in the 
course of reviewing the mitigating factors identified in the Standards: 
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["]A full and free disclosure to the client or the disciplinary 
authority prior to the discovery of any misconduct, or cooperative 
attitude toward the proceedings.["] The, the former doesn't apply. 
I will tell the Court that my dealings with Mr. Doncouse even 
though a, this was an inherently tense situation, have always been 
very cordial and a, for that I thank Mr. Doncouse and, and will 
register to the Court that a, I certainly have appreciated having 
cordial dealings with him.8 
(R. 227 at 193) 
The court also found "Doncouse has a good character and reputation in 
the legal community." (R. 205) The only evidence of this was the testimony of 
Duncan Murray, an attorney who assisted Doncouse during the period of his 
suspension. (R. 227 at 80-83) Murray testified as follows: 
I think he does [have a good reputation among other lawyers] for 
the most part. I think some of the things that have happened, the 
suspension period, some other things that have happened have 
tainted that just a little bit. But I think by in [sic] large most people 
do respect him as a good attorney. 
(R. 227 at 88-89) 
The court rejected impairment as a mitigating factor: "Impairment was not 
a mitigating factor because although there was testimony concerning some of 
Doncouse's medical conditions, these do not appear to be causally related in any 
way to the violations." (R. 206) 
The District Court made the following Conclusions of Law: 
Doncouse violated the terms of the Order of Discipline: Suspension 
entered by the District Court and is therefore in contempt of court. 
Doncouse violated Rule 5.5 (Unauthorized Practice of Law) by 
continuing to practice law, including holding himself out as an 
attorney and filing papers in court while his license was suspended. 
8 The OPC thus did not state that Doncouse was "extremely cooperative." The 
OPC has elected not to pursue this point on appeal, but argues that even if 
cordiality constitutes cooperation within the meaning of the Standards, it is 
entitled to little weight as mitigation. 
7 
Doncouse violated Rules 8.1(a) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary 
Matters) and 8.4(c) (Misconduct) by making misrepresentations of 
fact to prison officials and to the District Court by holding himself 
out as an attorney. Doncouse violated Rule 8.4(d) (Misconduct) by 
filing a paper in court for a client when he was not authorized to 
practice law, and by filing an Affidavit of Compliance falsely stating 
that he had complied with the order of suspension. Doncouse 
should be sanctioned with a suspension. 
(R. 206) 
The District Court imposed upon Doncouse asanction of suspension for a 
period of one year. (R. 207) The OPC's appeal ensued. (R. 221-222) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The public and the integrity of the legal profession are inadequately 
protected by imposing another suspension upon an attorney who continued to 
practice law in violation of a previous order of suspension, and who made false 
sworn statements to the Court in a bid for reinstatement from the earlier 
suspension. Consistent with the RLDD and the Standards, as well as this 
Court's opinion in a factually similar case and case authority from other 
jurisdictions, Doncouse should have been disbarred for knowing conduct that 
was prejudicial to the administration of justice, intended to benefit himself and to 
deceive the court, and caused serious or potentially serious injury. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Attorneys Who Continue to Practice Law in Violation of an Order of 
Suspension Should Be Sanctioned With Disbarment Because Their 
Actions Demonstrate a Fundamental Lack of Respect for the Courts 
and the Disciplinary System That Can Only Be Addressed With a 
More Severe Penalty 
This Court imposed disbarment upon an attorney who continued to 
practice law while he was under a term of suspension. See In re Richard B. 
Johnson, 830 P.2d 262, 263-264 (Utah 1992). Johnson "accepted new clients, 
negotiated retainer fees, provided legal advice to new and existing clients, held 
himself out to the public as one authorized to practice law, received 
compensation from his law firm, and represented to new clients that although it 
was necessary for another lawyer of the firm to be his 'mouth piece,' he would be 
the principal attorney and would continue to do all the legal work." id. The 
opinion stated, "The affidavits signed by his clients and filed with this court clearly 
show that during his suspension, Johnson continued to practice law in flagrant 
disregard of this court's order of suspension dated March 29, 1900. In the 
interest of protection of the public and the legal profession, this court must 
therefore order Johnson's disbarment" ]dL (emphasis added). The Johnson 
decision thus suggests that disbarment is called for when an attorney violates an 
order of suspension. 
The instant case is similar: Doncouse was suspended; he accepted a 
new client; he provided legal services to an existing client; he held himself out to 
prison officials and others as one authorized to practice law. Although the 
number of incidents may have been smaller than in Johnson, they occurred over 
a two-month period, and are numerically proportionate to the size of Doncouse's 
law practice, which was limited.9 Accordingly, the OPC considers Johnson a 
sound indicator of the Court's view of such cases and such a result is consistent 
with the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions ("Standards"), which provide 
9
 Doncouse testified that at the time of his suspension, he had a small practice, 
and "there was hardly anything there" to turn over to his colleague, Duncan 
Murray. (R. 227 at 157-158) 
9 
that "the court may impose further sanctions upon a lawyer who violates the 
terms of a prior disciplinary order."10 Rule 5.2, Standards. 
Although the details of the violations and the duration and number of the 
suspensions vary, as do some of the underlying disciplinary rules, decisions from 
several other jurisdictions are similar to that of the Johnson decision, and the 
result urged here. See af l . In re Phelps, 744 P.2d 428, 428 (Ariz. 1987) 
(disbarment is appropriate sanction for respondent who continued to practice law 
while suspended for disciplinary matter and administratively suspended for failure 
to pay annual membership fee); In re Crescenzi, 527 N.Y.S.2d 221, 224 (A.D. 1 
Dept. 1988) (disbarment appropriate for direct violation of order of suspension; 
collecting cases); In re Olitt, 538 N.Y.S.2d 537, 539 (A.D. 2d 273 (1989)) ("It is 
well settled that the practice of law by a suspended attorney is unlawful and 
warrants immediate disbarment"); In re Jorissen, 391 N.W.2d 822, 826 (Minn. 
1986) (attorney disbarred for practicing law while suspended; "5A principle 
purpose of the exercise of disciplinary authority is to assure respect for the 
orders of this court by attorneys, who, as much as judges, are responsible for the 
orderly administration of justice in this state/"); Committee on Professional Ethics 
and Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Ass'n v. Gartin, 272 N.W.2d 485, 492 (Iowa 
1978) (attorney's license revoked for practicing law while suspended); Iowa 
Informally, this is characterized as a "graduated" or "progressive" system of 
discipline, implicit in which is the broad concept that similar types of misconduct, 
absent compelling mitigation or aggravation, warrant progressively more severe 
sanction: reprimands follow admonitions, suspensions follow reprimands, and 
disbarment follows suspension. 
10 
Supreme Court Bd. of Professional Ethics and Conduct v. Postma, 555 N.W.2d 
680, 683 (Iowa 1996) (violations, including rule prohibiting conduct prejudicial to 
administration of justice, when considered with fact respondent under suspension 
for other violations, warrant revocation of license); In re Yamaqiwa. 650 P.2d 
203, 207-208 (Wash. 1982) (disbarment warranted for attorney who failed to 
notify clients of suspension, holding himself out as attorney, accepting new client 
matter, and misleading clients and others as to status); Florida Bar v. Greene. 
589 So.2d 281 (Fla. 1961) (four acts of practicing law while suspended warranted 
disbarment); Florida Bar v. Brown, 635 So.2d 13, 14 (Fla. 1994) (lawyer 
disbarred who continued to practice law after resignation with discipline pending; 
"Clear violation of any order or disciplinary statues that denies an attorney the 
license to practice law generally is punishable by disbarment, absent strong 
extenuating factors."); Florida Bar v. Weisser. 721 So.2d 1142 (Fla. 1998) 
(attorney disbarred for continuing to practice law after resignation with discipline 
pending); see ajso Kersey's Case, 797 A.2d 864 (N.H.. 2002) (attorney 
suspended for three months was in contempt of court for continuing to practice 
law and failing to deliver client files; referred for disbarment proceedings). 
Some courts have discussed the policy reasons underlying their decisions: 
to protect the public from attorneys who have demonstrated their disregard of 
similar orders, to protect the dignity of the courts, and to deter others. The 
Supreme Court of Washington, sitting en banc, stated that inasmuch as the 
respondent attorney had already been suspended at the time of his additional 
offenses, "disbarment appears to be the only insurance against repetition. Such 
n 
a severe sanction will also serve an important function of deterring others from 
violating a suspension sanction." Yamaqiwa, 650 P.2d at 208; see also Florida 
Bar v. Bauman, 558 So.2d 994, 994 (Fla. 1990) (attorney on six-month 
suspension disbarred for five acts constituting practice of law; "We can think of 
no person less likely to be rehabilitated than someone like respondent, who 
willfully, deliberately, and continuously, refuses to abide by an order of this 
Court."); State v. Schumacher. 519 P.2d 1116, 1128 (Kan. 1974) (additional 
suspension of finite duration rejected as inadequate for attorney who continued 
to practice law while suspended; attorney placed on indefinite suspension11); cf. 
Carter v. Bucci, 442 A.2d 865, 866 (R.I. 1982) ("This court hoped that the 
[second] suspension in addition to the other public consequences would have a 
salutory and deterrent effect. Obviously it did not. The record now before us 
proves a deliberate and conscious violation of our suspension order.. In view of 
the foregoing, we conclude that the only appropriate disposition in the case is to 
order the disbarment of Mr. Bucci."); In re Larson, 512 N.W.2d 454 (N.D. 1994) 
(attorney disbarred who practiced law while on second suspension; "This court's 
disciplinary orders are not intended to be empty noise."). 
Because Doncouse disobeyed an order suspending him for a short period, 
there is no reason to believe that a suspension of longer duration will be 
effective, nor does it deter other attorneys from similar misconduct. Moreover, a 
further suspension does nothing to safeguard respect for the administration of 
justice. Indeed, imposing another suspension upon an attorney who practices 
law in violation of an order suspension appears to encourage the very conduct it 
11
 Indefinite suspension is a sanction not available in Utah. 
12 
ostensibly corrects: if continued time out is the likely sanction, respondents who 
flaunt an initial court order can proceed as they like, secure in the knowledge that 
no worse scenario will befall them than the one that failed to deter them in the 
first place. 
II. Disbarment Is the Appropriate Discipline for Doncouse's Misconduct 
The RLDD provide that "It shall be grounds for discipline for a lawyer to: 
"(a) violate the Rules of Professional Conduct; (b) willfully violate a valid order of 
a court . . . imposing discipline; . . . ." Rule 9, RLDD. Doncouse did both, 
thereby subjecting himself to the imposition of discipline. 
The District Court correctly concluded that Doncouse's conduct violated 
numerous Rules of Professional Conduct. He continued to practice law while his 
license was suspended,12 in violation of Rule 5.5(a) of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct, which provides that "A lawyer shall not : . . . Practice law in a jurisdiction 
where doing so violates the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction." 
He made misrepresentations in his affidavit of compliance, in violation of Rule 
8.1(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which provides that "a lawyer.. . in 
connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not: . . . Knowingly make a false 
statement of material fact." (R. 206) The same statement, as well as his 
misrepresentation of his status to prison officials, also violated Rule 8.4(c) of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct, which provides that "It is professional misconduct 
12
 Although precise contours of what constitutes the practice of law have not 
been defined, attorneys know what lies within the definition. See In re Richard B. 
Johnson, 830 P.2d 262, 263 (Utah 1992). 
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for a lawyer to: . . . Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation." (R. 206) Doncouse also violated Rule 8.4(d) of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, which provides that it is professional misconduct to 
engage in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. (R. 206) 
Doncouse also "violated the terms of the Order of Discipline: Suspension entered 
by the District Court and is therefore in contempt of court."13 (R. 206) 
Sanctions are imposed pursuant to the Standards. See Rule 12, RLDD. 
The Standards provide that disbarment is the appropriate presumptive sanction 
for an attorney who 
(a) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined in 
Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e), or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another or to deceive the 
court, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a 
party, the public, or the legal system, or causes serious or 
potentially serious interference with a legal proceeding; or 
(c) engages in any other intentional misconduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously 
adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law. 
Rule 4.2(a), (c), Standards. As described below, the District Court's findings and 
conclusions concerning Doncouse's misconduct, and the inferences reasonably 
drawn therefrom, established each of the elements set forth in the disbarment 
provision. 
Doncouse's misconduct meets the criteria identified in Rule 4.2(a). 
Doncouse knowingly violated Rule 8.4(a), which provides that "[l]t is professional 
misconduct for a lawyer to . . . violate . . . the Rules of Professional Conduct" and 
13
 Pursuant to Utah statute, "Disobedience of any lawful judgment, order or 
process of the court" is contempt. Utah Code § 78-32-1(5). The Code also 
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Rule 8.4(d), which provides that "[l]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . 
. . [e]ngage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice." Rule 
8.4, Rules of Professional Conduct. Doncouse's intent was by turns to benefit 
himself or to deceive the court: he filed the false affidavit to deceive the court, 
and his intent in accepting the representation was selfishly motivated. (R. 205) 
Moreover, the court found that Doncouse's misconduct caused "significant 
damage to the legal system itself because "it creates and casts doubt on the 
integrity of the system itself," and "casts a negative aspect on lawyers generally 
and on the practice of law." (R. 204) It also caused potentially serious injury to a 
client. (R. 205) 
Further, Doncouse's misconduct meets the criteria of Rule 4.2 subsection 
(c) of the Standards because it involved dishonesty or misrepresentations to a 
court and to prison officials. These acts seriously adversely reflect on his fitness 
to practice law—particularly the act of filing a sworn affidavit containing false 
statements. See ag. In re Jorissen, 391 N.W.2d 822, 826 (Minn. 1986) 
("Deliberate deception of the courts is offensive in that it not only obstructs the 
administration of justice but also subverts 'that loyalty to the truth without which 
[one] cannot be a lawyer in the real sense of the word.'"). Unlike subsection (a), 
this subsection of the rule requires neither Doncouse's intent to benefit himself or 
deceive the court, nor the injury or potential injury resulting from his actions. 
Compare Rule 4.2(a), Standards, with Rule 4.2(c), Standards. 
provides that "[djeceit by a party to an action.. ." is a contempt of the authority of 
the court. Utah Code §78-32-1(4). 
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Doncouse's misconduct went well beyond the Standards' criteria for 
suspensions. Suspensions are for knowing violations of Rules 8.4(a) and (d), but 
without the intent to benefit the lawyer or deceive the court, and the requisite 
harm is "injury or potential injury,... or interference or potential interference with 
a legal proceeding." In this case, the injury to the legal system was "significant" 
and that to a client, potentially serious. Moreover, the reasonable inferences 
from the facts are that Doncouse acted to deceive the court and for his own 
benefit. 
Additionally, the aggravating factors are substantial and the mitigation 
insignificant. Doncouse's prior record of discipline, his selfish motive in taking a 
new case, the fact that there were multiple cases showing his disregard for the 
initial sanction, and his deception in submitting the affidavit and asking to be 
reinstated collectively weigh against his cooperation in the form of cordiality with 
the OPC, and his good character and reputation in the legal community as 
attested to by a single witness. In other words, nothing warrants a downward 
departure from the appropriate presumptive discipline. 
CONCLUSION 
The Standards provide that "[t]he purpose of imposing lawyer sanctions is 
to ensure and maintain the high standard of professional conduct required of 
those who undertake the discharge of professional responsibilities as lawyers, 
and to protect the public and the administration of justice from lawyers who have 
demonstrated by their conduct that they are unable or likely to be unable to 
discharge properly their professional responsibilities." Rule 1.1, Standards. The 
16 
Standards are designed to promote consideration of all relevant factors and the 
appropriate weight to be given each of them, as well as "consistency in the 
imposition of disciplinary sanctions." Rule 1.3, Standards. Because the result 
reached in this case appears to be contrary to the Standards and to the result 
reached by this Court in the Johnson case, the OPC seeks appellate review. 
Doncouse committed professional misconduct for which he was 
sanctioned with a short-term suspension imposed by order of the District Court. 
Instead of obeying the Court and honoring his obligation to protect the integrity of 
the legal system, Doncouse continued to practice law, then made a material 
misrepresentation to the Court concerning his activities while suspended. This 
misconduct warrants further sanction, and the appropriate sanction is 
disbarment. Accordingly, the OPC asks the Court to reverse the decision of the 
District Court, and to remand the case for entry of an order of disbarment. 
DATED: March QU? ,2003. 
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
Kate A. Toomey ' 
Deputy Counsel 
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Deputy Counsel 
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645 South 200 East 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the 
Discipline of: 
Russell T. Doncouse, #6718 
Respondent. ] 
\ FINDINGS OF FACT, 
\ CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
> AND ORDER OF DISCIPLINE: 
I SUSPENSION 
I Civil No. 020900608 OCT 0 
Judge Pamela Heffeman 
The Court having conducted an evidentiary hearing on August 28, 2002 
pursuant to its Order to Show Cause why the Respondent, Russell T. Doncouse, 
should not be held in contempt of court; having heard the argument of counsel; 
having reviewed the Hearing Briefs submitted by Doncouse and the Utah State 
Bar's Office of Professional Conduct ("OPC"); having taken the matter under 
advisement and being fully advised in the premises, does hereby make the 
following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and enters an Order of 
Discipline based thereon: 
Findings of Fact 
1. An Order of Discipline: Suspension was entered by this Court on 
March 1, 2002. Pursuant to the terms of that order, Doncouse was suspended 
from the practice of law for a period of ninety days, commencing March 1, 2002. 
2. On April 3, 2002, Doncouse requested access to an inmate client at 
the Utah State Prison. Doncouse identified himself as an attorney, used his Bar 
number, and signed papers identifying himself as the attorney of record for the 
inmate. 
3. On April 22, 2002, Doncouse filed on behalf of a client in the 
Second Judicial District Court, Weber County, Ogden Department, a paper 
captioned "Reply to Defendant's Objection to Plaintiffs Motion to Vacate Motion 
to Dismiss" in Davis v. Mikesell, Civil No. 970903671. The paper was signed by 
Doncouse and held him out as the attorney of record for the client. 
4. On May 31, 2002, Doncouse submitted to the Court an Affidavit of 
Compliance stating that he "refrained from the practice of law during the period of 
March 1, 2002 through May 31, 2002." That statement was false. 
5. In May 2002, Doncouse undertook the representation of Kevin 
Perry in a personal injury matter. Doncouse failed to disclose to Perry that 
Doncouse was suspended from the practice of law and therefore could not 
accept new client matters. 
6. Doncouse knowingly violated the Order of Discipline: Suspension 
when he filed the document in court, represented to prison officials that he was 
an attorney, and undertook the representation of a new client. 
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7. There was potential injury to Perry, inasmuch Doncouse was not 
able to adequately handle the case during the period of his suspension. 
Additionally, Doncouse's failure to take action may in fact have prejudiced Perry's 
case. Doncouse's actions also caused significant damage to the legal system 
itself because if a lawyer practices law while the lawyer is suspended, it creates 
and casts doubts on the integrity of the system itself. Moreover, the 
representations Doncouse made to prison officials and the necessity of going 
through this kind of disciplinary hearing casts a negative aspect on lawyers 
generally and on the practice of law. 
8. Aggravating circumstances are as follows: Doncouse has a prior 
record of discipline; Doncouse had a selfish motive in taking the Perry case; 
there were multiple cases, although none standing on its own was extremely bad, 
but taken as a group they showed disregard for the initial sanction; there were 
deceptive practices in the form of submitting an affidavit indicating that Doncouse 
had complied with all of the terms of the suspension and asked to be reinstated. 
9. Mitigating circumstances are as follows: Doncouse made a sincere 
effort to try to comply with the suspension by transferring cases, but it wasn't 
complete and that is where the problem lies. The OPC has indicated that 
Doncouse was extremely cooperative with them and cordial throughout these 
rather tense proceedings, although it created a certain amount of anxiety and 
tension for Doncouse and he handled himself well and was cooperative with the 
OPC. Doncouse has a good character and reputation in the legal community. 
10. Impairment was not a mitigating factor because although there was 
testimony concerning some of Doncouse's medical conditions, these do not 
appear to be causally related in any way to the violations. 
11. Suspension pursuant to Rule 4.3 of the Standards for Imposing 
Lawyer Sanctions is the appropriate sanction in this case. Although the OPC has 
requested disbarment, this is too harsh for the types of transgressions that 
occurred. 
Conclusions of Law 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court hereby makes the 
following Conclusions of Law: 
1. Doncouse violated the terms of the Order of Discipline: Suspension 
entered by this Court on March 1,2002 and is therefore in contempt of court. 
2. Doncouse violated Rule 5.5 (Unauthorized Practice of Law) by 
continuing to practice law, including holding himself out as an attorney and filing 
papers in court while his license was suspended. 
3. Doncouse violated Rules 8.1(a) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary 
Matters) and 8.4(c) (Misconduct) by making misrepresentations of fact to prison 
officials and to the Court by holding himself out as an attorney. 
4. Doncouse violated Rule 8.4(d) (Misconduct) by filing a paper in 
court for a client when he was not authorized to practice law, and by filing an 
Affidavit of Compliance falsely stating that he had complied with the Court's order 
of suspension. 
5. Doncouse should be sanctioned with a suspension. 
Order of Discipline: Suspension 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the 
Court hereby enters against Doncouse a sanction of suspension for a period of 
one year commencing thirty days after the entry of the judgment of suspension. 
The effective date of the suspension does not include the thirty-day wind-down 
period identified in Rule 26 of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability. 
DATED this 2_ day of ((JATZJti . 2002. 
Approved as to Form: 
Russell T. Doncouse 
